Bro Is Not An Astronaut

A disk image with a red herring binary - the real flag is hidden in encrypted telemetry fragments, requiring XOR key recovery and brute-forcing payload offsets.

Summary

The disk image contains two partitions and several deleted files that look like they should feed the airlockauth binary. That path is a red herring: the binary can be satisfied with the reconstructed token and decrypts a fake payload, but the real flag is hidden in three encrypted telemetry fragments. Recovering the deleted XOR key, identifying the telemetry layout, and extracting the correct offsets from alpha, bravo, and charlie reveals the actual flag.

Solution

The challenge can be solved in 5 steps:

Step 1 - Inspect the image and recover the deleted artifacts

Start from space_usb.img and enumerate both partitions. The FAT32 volume ASTRA9_USER contains the visible mission files, while the ext2 volume ASTRA9_CACHE contains mostly deleted data. Recover the deleted files from the cache partition, because the important pieces are not present in the live filesystem.

Step 2 - Rebuild the token and identify the airlockauth decoy

One recovered clue gives the token prefix ASTRA9-, while the deleted file crew_id.part2 contains BRO-1337. That reconstructs the token ASTRA9-BRO-1337. Running airlockauth with that token only prints "signal verified", and reversing the binary shows it derives an XOR key from seed32.bin, nav.bc, and payload.enc to decrypt a fake UVT string. That output is a red herring, so the real flag must come from the telemetry fragments instead.

Step 3 - Recover the telemetry key and parse the fragment structure

The deleted file diag_key.bin provides the 16-byte XOR key used by the telemetry blobs. The alpha, bravo, and charlie files all start with the TLM magic and include a sequence byte at offset 4. Byte 5 stores the encrypted payload length, while the actual encrypted bytes are buried deeper inside padding, so the correct payload offset must be located for each fragment.

Step 4 - Brute-force the payload offsets and decrypt each fragment

Testing offsets with key_start=0 reveals the real plaintext slices. Alpha decrypts from offset 27 with length 17 to UVT{d0nt_k33p_d1G. Bravo decrypts from offset 38 with length 17 to G1in_U_sur3ly_w0N. Charlie decrypts from offset 16 with length 18 to t_F1nD_aNythng_:)}. These three outputs are consistent, printable, and clearly parts of one flag.

Step 5 - Concatenate the fragments in sequence order

Join the decrypted telemetry pieces in alpha, bravo, charlie order. The complete flag is UVT{d0nt_k33p_d1GG1in_U_sur3ly_w0Nt_F1nD_aNythng_:)}. The intended lesson is that the USB image contains a fake cryptographic path through airlockauth, but the actual answer sits in the recovered telemetry data.